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Abstract
We combine a theoretical model and a quantitative modeling chain based
on a bio-economic model and a hydrological model in order to assess the
marginal damage related to the nitrate concentration in an aquifer. The fun-
damental concept is to take the steady state level resulting from a social
planner’s optimization program as the target level of nitrate concentration.
The interest of doing this is threefold: (i) we characterize the social value of
damage related to the targeted nitrate concentration; which (ii) leads us to
design the optimal path consistent with the target; and (iii) we can in turn
assess welfare losses arising when the tax path deviates from the optimal one.
1 Introduction
In recent years, scientists and environmental agencies have been reporting increasing
nitrate concentrations in water supplies, notably in the United States and Europe.
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This pollution is mostly due to agricultural activities (European Commission, 2010;
Parris, 2011)
To move beyond the handling of such water management problems according to ad-
ministrative borders, the European Water Framework Directive (WFD; 2000/60/EC)
has been designed to tackle them according to natural river basin boundaries. This
represents a paradigm shift towards integrated European water management and
policy. As a result, the implementation of the WFD poses challenges to water
managers, planning authorities, interested parties, and researchers, increasing the
demand for new tools including models to analyze, interpret, and display spatial
information for river basin planning.
If we are to assess management strategies according to the WFD, modeling tools
can help to test several policies and/or derive a theoretical best policy. Such tools
are based on a hydro-economic model applied to given basins. From a hydrological
point of view, these models must properly reproduce the physical behavior of the
systems with a realistic representation of the different surface and groundwater re-
sources, including their interaction, the spatial and temporal variability of resource
availability, and their impacts on nitrate concentration in the river basin, including
the aquifer, in both space and time.
Hydro-economic modeling has been used for many decades to investigate water man-
agement in terms of surface and groundwater (Young and Bredehoeft, 1972; Noel
and Howitt, 1982). More recently, significant advances have been made by applying
this kind of model to problems arising in cases of non-point source pollution. How-
ever, most of these studies focus on salinity and river pollution rather than on aquifer
pollution (Connor, 2008; Aftab et al., 2010, 2007). In order to better understand
the impact of policies dealing with water pollution, hydro-economic modeling inte-
grates three components: hydrological, economic and agronomic. However, when all
aspects of water management are under investigation, the integrated approach leads
to strong assumptions related to future water demand and irrigation.
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Moreover, among the empirical studies that deal with nitrate contamination, one
of the three components is often neglected. To focus on different scenarios and
compare their cost-effectiveness, these studies have relied on different methodologies.
They may refer to (i) a percentage of emission abatement reached before a given
date (Dellink et al., 2011; Brouwer et al., 2008), (ii) a mixed approach including
conversion of intensive arable land into extensive grassland and livestock reduction
(Volk et al., 2008) with input tax and set-aside management (Aftab et al., 2010), and
(iii) broader approaches based on applied general equilibrium modelling including
emission permit markets (Dellink et al., 2011; Brouwer et al., 2008), or (iv) the
“Bayesian belief network” approach (Barton et al., 2008).
Within the framework of an applied study, the comparison of scenarios allows us to
pinpoint the most cost-effective one, but it is not the optimal result in that it does not
arise from the maximization of a social planner’s objective function. A theoretical
approach based on over time trade-offs between farm profits and environmental
damage makes it possible to determine the optimal tax path over time. However, this
optimal path depends on many parameters, especially related to the environmental
damage function which remain difficult to bring to light.
To overcome the limits of the applied and theoretical approaches, we set out to
combine a theoretical model and a quantitative modeling chain based on a bio-
economic model and a hydrological model. Such models are able to estimate the
impacts of a farming system down to the aquifer water quality. Our study focused
on the largest of the three aquifers of the Seine basin in the Northern France. The
Seine basin intersects more than 6 millions agricultural hectares and provides the
most part of drinking water for 16 million people..
The fundamental concept is to take the targeted nitrate concentration as the steady
state level resulting from a social planner’s optimization program. By doing this,the
social planner is assumed to have enough insight into the environmental and human
health damage to be able to estimate the sustainable concentration threshold. In
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doing so, he/she can access the monetary damage related to the pollution by using
inverse modeling such as in this study. In that way, the social planner is in possession
of information on monetary damage related to the pollution when the policy is
chosen. To sum up, we aim at assessing the marginal value parameter as one that
would be consistent with a social welfare maximizing planner and the targets set
for the aquifer. Then, instead of computing an annual maximum nitrate stock as
a function of damage assuming the monetary cost to be known, as is usually done
in spite of the risks of not achieving the target concentration on time because of
the time lag between the source (the nitrogen leaching flow) and its consequences
(the aquifer contamination) associated with the hydrological transfer, the method we
propose theoretically optimizes the policy for a given long-term goal, with year-on-
year reduced cost of damage and contamination patterns that achieve the targeted
time limit. In the aim of inferring the monetary damage parameter, we base an
NO3-loss tax on the theoretical implicit price of the damage in the long run. when
a set of constant-rate taxes is implemented over time in appropriate agro-economic
and hydrological models, and this set is taken in a sufficiently wide range, we can
asses the tax level that will allow the target to be reached. then this tax provides the
values of the damage parameter. Once the damage parameter has been estimated, we
can design the benchmark tax path over time related to the solution of the optimal
control problem including the inferred damage function. Although the present study
includes more physics, the numerous hypotheses mean that it is still a theoretical
approach, and the resulting tax path should be seen as a benchmark policy. A part
of this idea was originally put forward in the work of Lee and Kim (2002). By
minimizing the intertemporal cost to private farmers achieving a given target at a
given date, they deduced an ’optimal tax’. However, as they did not use a damage
function, they could neither assess the social value of the damage related to the
nitrate concentration nor provide a welfare analysis in order to compare different
tax policies
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The interest of our methodology is the threefold: (i) we characterize the social value
of damage related to the targeted concentration level of nitrate, with an explicit
and physical estimation of the time lag between the source of the problem and the
damage; which (ii) leads us to design the optimal path consistent with the target; and
(iii) we can in turn assess“welfare losses”arising when the tax path deviates from the
optimal one. Estimating the marginal damage of nitrate concentration, in monetary
terms, and comparing various scenarios in terms of welfare, including the optimal
tax path resulting from an optimal control program combined with quantitative
simulation models dedicated to agricultural supply and hydrological transfers are
two key points of our work. Although the question of the cost of reaching the
WFD’s or EPA’s objectives has been extensively covered in the literature, it is still
of interest and indeed necessary to assess the impacts of more and more stringent
environmental policies, which are regularly announced and still not implemented. To
sum up, the marginal social value of damage in terms of nitrate concentration in the
largest aquifer of the Seine river basin is assessed to be 1.1 C mgNO3/l (ha an)−1
when the concentration target is set at 50 mgNO3/l. It is assessed to be 21.9
C mgNO3/l (ha an)−1 when the target is set at 38 mgNO3/l. In addition, we
estimate the impact of the inherent variability of physical parameters across the
aquifer which leads to a level of uncertainty that increases with the stringency of the
target. We also show that applying a constant tax path instead of the optimal one
leads to a discounted welfare loss of 0.5% for a concentration target of 38 mg/l. The
discounted welfare loss can be as much as 2.3% when a tax path less objectionable
to farmers to used to meet the same target.
The paper is organized as follows. The modeling methodology is presented in section
2. The integrated approach and the damage parameter assessment are explained in
section 3. In section 4, we compare estimates of welfare loss induced by various
suboptimal scenarios. We conclude by highlighting how combining an applied and
a theoretical approach makes it possible to estimate the marginal social value of
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damage related to a given nitrate concentration.
2 Models
The modeling of our case study is presented in two parts, firstly the theoretical
framework, and then the applied aspect involving a bio-economic model linked to a
hydrological model.
2.1 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework is based on a dynamic control model proposed by Bour-
geois and Jayet (2015). A social planner maximizes the discounted sum of agricul-
tural profit minus the damage value related to the apply of nitrogen fertilizers. Soil
nitrogen losses play a role in the accumulation of nitrate in aquifers which is the
pollution targeted in our analysis.
Let us consider the set of farmers contributing to the nitrate pollution. Farming ac-
tivity is represented by the demand for N -fertilizer denoted by x. Activity depends
on the soil characteristics summarized by a one-dimensional θ parameter. The indi-
vidual farm profit function π(x, θ) is defined for any positive x and for any θ over
the interval Θ = [
¯
θ, θ̄]. The probability density function denoted by γ(θ) is assumed
to be strictly positive at any θ within the interval. The related cumulative function
is denoted by Γ(θ). Accordingly, the global profit per unit time is expressed by∫
Θ π(x(θ, t), θ)γ(θ)dθ. Usual assumptions apply to π, which is assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable, increasing and concave with respect to the fertilizer input
x.
Regarding the environmental impact and related damage, the standard framework
for pollutant accumulation problems applies. The state of the aquifer is characterized
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by the nitrate concentration assumed to be uniform in this theoretical part of the
study, and which is denoted by z. The dynamic evolution over time is the result
of a double-side effect. On the one hand, the clearing effect takes the form of
an exponential characterized by the decline rate τ . On the other hand, nitrates
accumulate in the aquifer due to N -fertilizer leached by any θ farm at any time t.
At this point, a key aspect of our analysis comes into play: the introduction of a time
lag, β, characterizing the nitrate transfer between the top soil and the groundwater.
At the root zone level, nitrate losses depend on the fertilizers consumed by any θ
farm at ant time t, and the related emission function is denoted by e(x, θ) (let us
recall that x depends on t and θ). All root zone nitrates reach the aquifer, and
the related nitrate accumulation depends on the aquifer thickness. For the sake of
simplicity, the time lag is assumed not to depend on θ and the aquifer thickness 1/a
is assumed to be constant over the whole physical domain. The time evolution of
the environmental system is described by equation (1).
ż(t) = −τz(t) + a
∫
Θ
e(x(θ, t− β), θ)γ(θ)dθ (1)
In the social planner’s objective, the aquifer nitrate concentration is expressed
through a damage function D(z) which is assumed to be increasing and convex.
The social planner is assumed to be perfectly informed about the aquifer charac-
teristics and the transfer process as well as all individual farm activity at any time.
His/her objective over time W is expressed by (2).
W =
∫ ∞
0
[
∫
Θ
π(x(θ, t), θ)γ(θ)dθ −D(z(t))]e−δtdt (2)
Accordingly, his/her program refers to (3).
max
x(θ,t)
W subject to (1) and to boundary conditions (3)
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The problem is solved following the Hamiltonian approach (fully detailed in Bour-
geois and Jayet (2015)), where λ denotes the current shadow price of the environ-
mental variable z thanks to the boundary conditions (i.e., known values of x when
t ∈ [−β, 0] and the transversality condition satisfied). Let us summarize the set of
equations useful for the present analysis by (R1).
∀θ, ∀t > 0 : πx(x∗(θ, t), θ) = a ex(x∗(θ, t), θ)λ(t+ β)e−δβ
ż∗(t) = −τz∗(t) + a
∫
Θ e(x∗(θ, t− β), θ)γ(θ)dθ
λ̇∗(t)− (τ + δ)λ∗(t) = −Dz(z∗(t))
(R1)
The shadow price λ refers to the pollution state, i.e., z. The steady-state solution
(z̄, λ̄) comes easily when ż = 0 and λ̇ = 0. For interpretations, we note that when
the delay is neglected, the optimal consumption of fertilizers is overestimated (Kim
et al., 1993). Moreover, the shadow price and the corresponding optimal tax depend
on the delay parameter, which implies that a decreasing tax path can be required
even if the initial stock of pollutant is too low (Bourgeois and Jayet, 2015).
2.2 The agro-economic model
The investigation undertaken here relies on an updated version of the economic
model, AROPAj, presented by De Cara et al. (2005) and updated by Galko and
Jayet (2011). The model consists of a set of independent1, mixed integer linear-
programming (MILP) models. Each model describes the economic behavior of a
representative farmer (or a ‘farm group’) with respect to eligible crops, crop area al-
location, animal numbers, and animal feeding. The farm group’s program is to max-
imize its gross margin with respect to a set of constraints. The set of constraints in-
cludes (i) crop rotation and agronomic constraints; (ii) CAP-related constraints; (iii)
restrictions concerning animal demography and nutritional requirements; and (iv)
1Regarding France and the V2 version, used in this paper, 54 MILPs act for the Seine river
basin.
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restrictions concerning quasi-fixed production factors (land and livestock).2 Farm
groups are assumed to represent the agricultural sector at the regional level given
and the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) is the basis for calibration. In
comparison to many bioeconomic models, the fact that we use a FADN sample of
farms clustered into farm groups makes it possible to avoid problems of data confi-
dentiality and account for farm heterogeneity (e.g., Aftab et al. (2010, 2007)). The
AROPAj calibration process is addressed by the re-estimation of the model parame-
ter subset through a combination of Monte Carlo and gradient methods, in order to
minimize the deviation between FADN estimated values and model results at farm
group level (De Cara and Jayet, 2000). The AROPAj calibration process keeps the
production set large, so AROPAj findings allow land allocation among crops, as is
seen, for instance, in cases of change in CAP and in price or tax (Jayet and Petsakos,
2013).
Changes occurring in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) from 2003 to 2007
have been taken into account. Among them, decoupling schemes are known to
trigger significant changes in the European agricultural sector (Galko and Jayet,
2011). As is the case throughout France, the Seine river basin is obviously strongly
impacted by changes in the CAP.
Balana et al. (2011) note that a large number of agri-environmental WFD-related
studies are based on ‘stylized’ farms and consequently fail to capture the inherent
heterogeneity of real-world farms, thereby sending wrong signals upstream in the
decision making process. They suggest using actual farm data instead of ‘stylized’
farm design. Our methodology make use the advantages of these two approaches.
On the one hand, farm groups recreate the agricultural sector at the regional scale
thanks to the use of FADN data. On the other hand, the functional form model
related to any farm group allows changes in economic policies to be taken into
account, such as a tax on agricultural pollutants
2Following De Cara et al. (2005), our central set of simulations assumes that livestock numbers
are allowed to vary within +/- 15 % of the values reported in the FADN database.
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A combination of the economic model AROPAj and the crop model STICS (Bris-
son et al., 1998, 2003) increases the model capacity to seize the adaptation of the
farming system to price and to capture the farming system heterogeneity because
soil characteristics and, more generally, pedo-climatic conditions are taken into con-
sideration. Following the work of Godard et al. (2008), nitrogen input is calibrated
to yield functions for the different farm groups and for most of the crops significant
in terms of area and production (It accounts for soft wheat, durum wheat, barley,
maize, sunflower, rapeseed, sugar beet, and potatoes.)
The crop model enables us to calibrate Mitscherlich-like exponential functions, through
an accurate process of inferred physical parameter and curve selection, which requires
a huge number of crop model runs (Godard et al., 2008). The N -yield functions re-
place fixed N -yield points and, consequently, changes in price or tax lead to changes
in N - intakes and yields as optimal responses at the plot level.3 The model becomes
non linear, but this potential difficulty is easily overcome by a two-step optimization
procedure. The first-step makes the per hectare gross margins optimal by comput-
ing N -input and yield for any crop and any farm-group. The second step uses these
yields and N -inputs to start linear programming models. It should be noted that
animal manure management is a source of nitrogen which accounts for a part of crop
N -input in the model.
Finally, in addition to nitrogen-input to yield functions, the crop model provides
nitrogen input to nitrogen-loss functions. We focus here on nitrogen to nitrate
functions when nitrate losses occur at the root zone. Similarly to Aftab et al. (2010),
we derive the leaching functions from STICS outputs when nitrogen input varies
within a reasonable range. Linear regression applied to STICS outputs allows us
to relate N-losses and fertilizer amounts (through affine functions). Consequently,
3This two-step process leads to the optimal solution when at least a part of each crop production
is marketed. This is the case for almost all farming systems involved on the Seine river basin. When
all production is on-farm used (for feed), we need shadow prices, instead of market prices, possibly
computed by an iterative process. Without use of this iterative process, we obtain a slightly
sub-optimal solution.
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N -loss in the NO3, related to crop j and farm group n depends on the N -input
through the relation (4), A and B are estimated for a given plant on a given soil in
the form
[NO3]j,n(N) = Aj,nN +Bj,n (4)
More details on the N-loss estimation procedure in accordance with the selection
and calibration of N-yield functions are given in Jayet and Petsakos (2013). To sum
up, in terms of outputs, for any given tax scenario, AROPAj provides, among other
things, the optimal amount of fertilizers for each crop, the optimal surface area to
be devoted to each crop and the NO3 losses at soil-root level.
2.3 Coupling with the hydrological model
The Seine river basin is characterized by the presence of several overlayed aquifer
layers. The MODCOU application represents the whole Seine basin (95,560 km2)
and the three major aquifers designated accordingly to their geology (figure 1):
the Oligocene (sands and limestone), the Eocene (sands and limestone), and Chalk
(Cretaceous chalk), with a spatial resolution varying from 1 to 8 km (Gomez, 2002;
Gomez et al., 2003; Ledoux et al., 2007).
The use of the hydrological model MODCOU allows the nitrate transfer from the root
zone toward the groundwaters of the Seine river basin. The hydrological model MOD
COU (Ledoux, 1980; Ledoux et al., 1984, 1989) computes the daily water balance
using climatic data (rainfall, PET), the water flow to and in the river network, and
also the flow to, in, and between aquifer layers and the interactions between rivers
and each layer of the free part of the aquifer. It is also able to compute the convective
transfer of solute to, in, and between those layers.
Regarding the MODCOU model, the initial condition (in 2002) can affect the simu-
lation over several decades due to transfer time through the unsaturated zone (UZ)
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and aquifer nitrogen accumulation. Thus, special attention was paid to obtaining
realistic initial conditions for the AROPAj-MODCOU simulation. Initialization is
based on the MODCOU-STICS simulations (as described in Ledoux et al. (2007)
and in Viennot P. (2007)), and is aimed at correctly reproducing the nitrate stock
in the UZ, among other things, at the starting date of simulation (2002). In such
simulations, STICS provides estimates of the nitrate flux entering in the UZ over the
period 1971-2002 and reaching the aquifer from 2003. Moreover, MODCOU-STICS
provides the NO3 reference flux as the mean value of 2002-2004 fluxes (fig 2).
Coupling of AROPAj and MODCOU comes into play from the simulation start date
(2002). In this respect, we use the AROPAj spatialization process which geograph-
ically distributes AROPAj output at a fine level of resolution The three-step spa-
tialization process starts with the spatial econometrics model developed by Chakir
(2009). Firstly, crop location is estimated in relation to physical data at a very fine
resolution. Secondly, a cross entropy method refines crop location probabilities. In
the third step, the FADN is linked up to the high resolution crop location, allowing us
to estimate the location of farm groups on the same resolution grid. This three-step
process is detailed in Cantelaube et al. (2012). The spatialization method provides
the contribution of each farm group on each cell of the grid to the regional (FADN)
agricultural activity. This enables any AROPAj output to be distributed over the
geographical area, i.e., the Seine river basin. Soil-root nitrate losses related to fer-
tilizer use are then distributed on a grid compatible with the spatial resolution of
the hydrological model. Following the temporal tax path, spatialized simulated NO3
fluxes provided by the AROPAj model feed MODCOU by topsoil nitrate changes
according to the formula:
NO3 input = Mean[NO3 MODCOU-STICS(2001− 2003)] (5)
∗[1 + NO3 AROPAj(year)−NO3 AROPAj(2002)
NO3 AROPAj(2002) ]
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For each year, the signal transmitted to MODCOU is based on the average emis-
sion provided by the coupled physical models (MODCOU-STICS) on the period
[2001,2003], augmented with the annual variation provided by AROPAj and related
to temporal tax path.
Finally a “scenario” is defined as a set of time-ordered annual AROPAj inputs from
the date 0 up to a given horizon T . Any of t-annual AROPAj runs provides an
NO3 lixiviated flux which is transfered to the groundwater by the dynamic hydro-
logical model MODCOU. More accurately, a scenario consists of a fertilizer tax path
combined with one level of exogenous livestock adjustment. Scenarios may differ
according to the tax path and to the level of livestock adjustment. In terms of CAP
context, we assume that the Agenda 2000 scheme holds up to and including 2006
and that the “decoupled Luxembourg scheme” applies as of 2007. Figure (fig2) sum-
marizes the integration process. In this integrated modeling application, we focus
on the largest of the three aquifers within the Seine river basin, the chalk aquifer,
and, more precisely, the free part of the aquifer, which is both the most affected by
nitrate contamination and the most subject to water withdrawal. For the economic
analysis, the NO3 concentration in the aquifer is calculated as the annual median
value for the entire chalk aquifer.
3 The integrated approach
The theoretical model and the quantitative integrated model match when the dam-
age function is set explicitly. To do this, the linear derivative of the function ad-
dresses the need for parsimony and for an easily tractable approximation when dam-
age varies within a relatively narrow range of values. Consequently we adopt the
quadratic form (6).
D(z) = k2z
2, k > 0 (6)
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The advantage here is that the social marginal damage is represented through the
use of a single parameter. At this step, this parameter is still unknown.
By considering the dynamic system at the steady state (R1), we can now relate the
damage parameter, k, and the steady-state concentration, z̄, through the following
system (R2).
∀θ : πx(x̄(θ), θ) = a ex(x̄(θ), θ)λ̄e−δβ
τ z̄ = a
∫
Θ e(x̄(θ), θ)γ(θ)dθ
(τ + δ)λ̄ = k z̄
(R2)
Rearranging the last equation of system (R2) leads to relation (7).
λ̄ = k z̄(τ + δ) (7)
Let us reverse the roles of z and k and consider the concentration level z̄ to be the
target set by the social planner. Making this assumption that the social planner
maximizes the social welfare reveals the marginal social value of the damage kz̄
through relation (7). Obviously this value depends implicitly on the structure of
both the agricultural production, π(x, θ), and the pollutant emission, e(x, θ)). It
also depends on the discount rate (δ) and the physical parameters of the hydrological
system (τ , β, a).
Finally, we implement the tax, µ, on the pollutant emissions e. For any θ-farm at
any time t, the private optimal choice is obtained by solving the equation πx(x, θ) =
µ ex(x, θ). Through the first equation of system (R1), this leads to the important
but simple equation (8) linking this tax to the implicit price λ associated to with
the state variable z.
µ(t) = ae−δβλ(t+ β) (8)
In the long term, this equation becomes µ̄ = ae−δβλ̄. This long-term nitrate emission
tax equation can be transformed to highlight the link between the tax and the social
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marginal damage kz̄, as in relation (9).
µ̄ = ae
−δβ
τ + δ kz̄ (9)
A tax set on soil-root nitrate losses can be implemented easily in the AROPAj model.
Let us consider the scenario in which the tax is constant over time. The MODCOU
model reaches the steady state when root zone nitrate losses provided by AROPAj
are applied on an annual basis and the simulation is run over a 100-year period. If
we repeat the simulation process (AROPAj and MODCOU) for a set of taxes, we
obtain a set of steady-state values, z̄. We assume that these simulations include
the steady state that is the social planner’s target. Finally, let us consider that
economic and physical parameters δ, τ , β, and a are given or estimated. Equation
(9) provides estimates of the damage parameter,k, and the social marginal value,
kz̄, of the damage associated with the nitrate concentration in the aquifer.
We choose to set the discount rate δ to 0.04.4
3.1 Physical parameters on average and variance
The natural decline rate, τ , and the mean time lag, β, of nitrate transfer between
the root zone and the groundwater are approximated by the MODCOU model.
Estimates are τ̄ = 0.02 y−1 and β̄ = 20 which means that around 2 % of the water
and solute in the aquifer are renewed each year, and that there is a 20-year time lag
before the pollution reaches the free part of the Chalk aquifer (Philippe et al., 2011).
The average water column height acts as 1/a in the theoretical economic model. It
is estimated to be 1/ā = 13.5 m without porosity.
4Most economists use and recommend discount rates ranging from 3 to 5% when trying to put
a price tag on future damage (Evans and Sezer, 2004). The E.P.A uses a rate of 3%, and the
European commission suggests a rate of 5% since 2008 (European Commission, 2008). Since 2004,
France, where our case study is located, has been following Lebègue et al. (2005) who recommend
a discount rate of 4%
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The Chalk aquifer is characterized by strong heterogeneity. Moreover, errors in the
measurement of phenomena, which are inherent in quantitative models, lead us to
randomize these two physical parameters. We distribute the parameter values ac-
cording to two probability distributions in order to delimit the k value. We select
uniform and lognormal distributions, centered around the previous approximate val-
ues, thus ensuring that the parameters values are always positive. The 1/a parameter
follows the lognormal distribution such that ln(ā/a) 7→ N (0, 0.18), and the β time
lag follows the lognormal distribution such that ln(β/β̄) 7→ N (0, 0.25). Regarding
the uniform distributions, the effective thickness of the aquifer, 1/a, is distributed
in the interval [5, 22] meters and β is distributed in the interval [10, 30] years. In
total 10,000 simulations were run for the two sets of probability distributions. Un-
like these two parameters, the clearing rate, τ , is assumed to remain constant and
homogeneous in the aquifer. These elements are summed up in Table (1).
Let us consider given values of the steady state ẑ and the tax level µ̂ which allows the
aquifer to reach the state ẑ when the tax µ̂ is constantly implemented over time. We
take this tax to be the first-best long-term tax considering the value of the damage
characterized by k. The mean value of the marginal social damage k̂ẑ is assessed
through the relation (10).
k̂ẑ = E
a,β
[k]ẑ = µ̂(τ + δ)E
a,β
[e
δβ
a
] (10)
3.2 From nitrate target to social marginal damage value
Let us consider a set of I constant tax scenarios over 100 years together with runs of
the AROPAj and MODCOU models. We keep the I 2-tuples {µ̂i,ẑi}i=1,I . The tax
µ̂i is set equal to 0.25(i− 1) (C per kgN in NO3) and I = 21. Then we estimate k
when the corresponding target NO3 concentration in the aquifer is considered as the
optimal social level. For each tax value and each of the two distribution densities, we
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made 10,000 calculations of k, reflecting the heterogeneity of the physical parameters.
Figure (3) displays the monetary marginal damage (k∗z) related to the concentration
taken to be the optimal level. A 1 mgNO3/l decrease in a target means that the
marginal damage increases by 1.7 C (mgNO3/l ha year)−1.
Focusing on the two targets given, 50 and 38 mg/l5, we estimate the marginal
damage by 1.1 and 21.9 C (mgNO3/l ha year)−1respectively; in other words, a
dramatic increase in the marginal damage. When the targeted concentration level is
38 mg/l, the standard deviation of the marginal damage is estimated at 9.1 and 6.5
C (mgNO3/l ha year)−1 when the parameter distributions follow uniform densities
and lognormal densities respectively.
4 Welfare Impact
4.1 Welfare loss induced by non-optimal regulation
In this investigation, welfare can be understood by including the net farmers’ profit
and the environmental damage caused by nitrate in the aquifer (by assuming that
tax is lump-sum monetary transfers between the farmers and the rest of the society,
we can suppress it from the welfare computation). Once the target, z̄ , has been
set and the marginal damage, k ∗ z̄ , is estimated, the k estimate allows the welfare
to be calculated explicitly. We compare welfare according to scenarios differing in
terms of tax path and AROPAj livestock adjustment.
As a benchmark, the theoretical model leads to an assessment of the optimal time
path of the tax when the targeted NO3 concentration is close to the steady state
after 100 years and when the parameters are set at their average values as mentioned
5According to Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 De-
cember 2006, 50 mg/l is the standard imposed and 38 mg/l the standard recommended to reverse
significant and sustained upward trends
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above. Other scenarios are designed to be more acceptable to farmers. In other
words, the time path of the tax is different. In addition, we consider that livestock
numbers may be adjusted because of the tax on all root zone nitrate lixiviation
(mineral and organic sources). In consequence, we define four scenarios: (i) optimal
nitrate tax path, (ii) constant tax over time, (iii) exponential tax path when the
tax reaches 90 % of the long-term tax value after 10 years, and (iv) 90 % of the
long-term tax value is reached after 20 years. All policy scenarios are completed by
a range of livestock adjustments from 0 to 15%, 30% and 45%.
The optimal tax path is achieved by solving the time differential system (R1) when
the k-value is related to the aquifer NO3 concentration of 50 and 38mg/l respectively.
The past path of the period [−β, 0], required by the calculation, is provided by the
MODCOU model. The 0-time z(0) is the estimated 2002 NO3 concentration in the
aquifer. All policies converge toward the same nitrate concentration in the aquifer in
the long term when the long-term tax is set at the steady-state value and when the
amplitude of the livestock adjustment is given. Offering the farmers the possibility
of adjusting their livestock numbers leads to significant changes in tax levels when
the target is set at 50 mgNO3/l. If the adjustment increases livestock numbers, it
is necessary to decrease the tax levels to reach the target. Different tax paths are
represented in figure (4).
Figure (5), on the left, displays the tax refunded profit over time for each scenario
that differs in terms of tax path and livestock adjustment when the targeted nitrate
concentration is 50 mgNO3/l. As the livestock adjustment leads to a dramatic
decrease in the long-term tax required to reach the target, not surprisingly, the
sum of farmers’ profit and tax refunds is higher when the livestock adjustment
increases. Nevertheless, focusing on economic effort, there is only a very slight
difference between the scenarios and the path does not impact farmers’ profit to any
great extent. This situation occurs thanks to the low level of taxes. Whatever the
scenario chosen, the evolutions of the aquifer nitrate concentration over time are
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very close. (see Figure (6)).
To sum up, when the target is not difficult to reach, an adjustment at farm level such
as a livestock adjustment offers the possibility of strongly attenuating the harshness
of the policy tool, i.e., the tax on pollutant emission. Table (2) displays estimates
of discounted welfare according to scenarios and targets.
Let us now consider the more stringent target, 38 mgNO3/l. Figure (5), on the right,
represents the farmers’ profit path when the tax path and the range of livestock
adjustment make it possible to reach this target. Compared to the 50mgNO3/l
target, time-curve shapes and scenarios now differ significantly.
Figure (6) displays the nitrate concentration paths converging on either the 50 or 38
mgNO3/l target. Implementation of a non-optimal tax path may lead to significant
changes in profits, nitrate concentration and welfare over time. The worst of our
scenarios would result in a 2060 nitrate concentration 4 mgNO3/l higher than the
optimal one. The time lag strengthens the impact of a non-optimal scenario. It takes
about twenty years to see any impact of the regulation. However, if we compare the
constant- tax scenario with scenario 3 (reaching 90 % of long-term value after ten
years), we see that the profits induced by these two scenarios are equal after twenty
years whereas the concentration levels are equal from 80 years onward (figure 6).
If the social self-imposes intermediate targets for himself, for example 42 mg/l, we
can see that the optimal scenario reaches this intermediate target ten years before
the constant scenario and twenty years before the scenario that is the most accom-
modating for farmers. Contrary to the situation for instantaneous pollution, when
lagged pollution is considered, the social planner cannot rely on observation to man-
age developments. The longer the time delay on the pollution, the more important
it is to act early and get as close as possible to the optimal policy. We note that
the business as usual scenario, reproducing the actual agricultural practices with no
livestock adjustment, leads to an NO3 concentration stabilization at a slightly higher
level of 50 mg/l. Figures (7) and (8) show the welfare induced over time by each
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tax scenario and livestock adjustment. For a given target of 50 mg/l, the welfare
loss occurring in the case of sub-optimal scenarios is close to zero and mainly due to
livestock adjustment. In the case of 38 mg/l target, welfare induced by the optimal
taxation scenario is lower than for other scenarios during the first twenty years. The
optimal regulation impacts the gross margin more strongly but, because of the lag,
does not impact N03 concentration. Later, the opposite occurs.In addition, livestock
adjustment supplies flexibility. Consequently, scenarios including high levels of ad-
justment may be more efficient than the optimal one when adjustment is excluded.
This highlights the importance of not managing the mineral fertilizers alone.
Table (2) shows the discounted welfare in 2003 with a discount rate of 4%. The
worst tax scenario shows a welfare loss of 2.3 % in comparison to the optimal tax
scenario for a given target of 38 mg/l. A constant tax scenario, often consideration
in publications (e.g., Lacroix et al. (2005); Kosenius (2010)), leads to a welfare loss
of 0.5 %.
It should be noted that the business as usual (BAU) estimate of discounted welfare
leads to 0.02% (respectively 8.72%) loss in the 50mg/l (respectively 38mg/l) case
compared to welfare induced by the optimal tax path in the 50 mg/l (respectively
38 mg/l) case (with 0% livestock adjustment).
4.2 Impact of discount rate
The discount rate impacts the calculations of the damage parameter (see Equation
(10)) and accordingly the marginal damage. We illustrate this in table 3, which
provides the marginal damage values related to two target concentrations of 38 and
50 mg/l and to values of discount rate of 3, 4 and 5%. To consider an increase
of discount rate from 3 to 4% (resp. from 4 to 5) implies an increase of marginal
damage of 50% (resp. 45%), for any target. The impact is clearly strong and it is
strengthened by the lag. It is the term exp−δ∗β in equation (10) that mainly deter-
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mines the impact of discount rate on marginal damage. When there is no time lag,
the impact of increasing discount rate from 3 to 4% (respectively 4 to 5%) on the
marginal damage is only 20% (respectively 15%) (see Table 3). Commonly, increas-
ing discount rate leads to a decrease in the value of environmental damage arising in
the long term. When we focus on a given target (long term nitrate concentration),t
he same effect of discount rate means that increasing the discount rate is related
to an increasing value of the damage estimated by the social planner. Regarding
the welfare evaluation, the discount rate has a double-sided effect. In addition to
the effect of the discount rate on the marginal damage explained above, there is
the standard effect on the present versus future costs and benefits. Consequently,
change in cumulated farm profit over time is amplified when policies differ (in terms
of tax path over time), and, due to converging tax paths, differences are visible in
the early period. On the damage side, the differences are attenuated (the effect of
policies on nitrate concentration is visible only after a period equivalent to the time
lag). This complex double-sided effect is itself impacted by the level of the target. In
the 38 mg/l case, the difference in discounted welfare cumulated over time between
the benchmark policy (i.e. the optimal tax path) and the policy reaching 90% of
the long-term tax after 10 years is respectively 0.5, 1.4, or 4.1% when the discount
rate is 3, 4, or 5%. The difference between the benchmark and the business as usual
(BAU) case is respectively 4.8, 8.7,and 20% when the discount is of 3, 4, and 5%. In
other words, higher the discount rate, higher the difference between the optimal case
and the alternative case. The discount rate effect has no significant impact in the
50 mg/l case. Regarding the comparison between the optimal case and the BAU,
difference in cumulated discounted welfare decreases when discount rate increases.
This difference is respectively 0, 0.02 or 0.01% when the discount rate is 3, 4 or 5%
(see Table 4).
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5 Conclusion
We set out to assess the marginal social value of nitrate pollution in the chalk
aquifer in the Seine river Basin. The methodology involves reversing the role of the
nitrate concentration in the aquifer, and the damage parameter. We consider the
nitrate concentration target as the steady-state level resulting from a social planner’s
program in which the lag is taken into account. To this end, we combine a theoretical
model and a quantitative modeling chain based on bio-economic and hydrological
models.
We show that decreasing the target by 1 mgNO3/l is equivalent to assessing an
increase in marginal damage of 1.7 C.(mg/l.ha.year)−1. When targets are 50 and
38 mg/l, the related marginal damages are 1.1 and 21.9 C.(mg/l.ha.year)−1, i.e.,
differs by a factor of 20.6. Moreover, the estimated damage parameter allows us to
design the optimal path consistent with the target and to assess the welfare losses
arising when the tax path deviates from the optimal one. We show that applying the
constant tax path instead of the optimal one leads to significant discounted welfare
loss when the aquifer target NO3 concentration increases in stringency, up to 0.5%
in the case of 38 mgNO3/l.In this case, the dis- counted welfare loss can reach 2.3%
when a tax path that is more favorable to farmers during early years meets this
target Although the present study draws benefit from hydrological modeling of the
aquifer nitrogen concentration and from a well calibrated agro-economic model, it
should be seen partly as a theoretical approach as well as being considered an applied
study because of the assumptions made. Strong assumptions are introduced via the
questionable value of the discounted rate and mainly via the long-run concentration
target resulting from an optimal choice by the policy maker. It should be noted
that the selected target, i.e., the mean aquifer concentration, might not be the
strongest constraint, as part of the aquifer will, of course, still have a concentration
above the threshold even when the target is reached. Moreover, the mean aquifer
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concentration cannot be observed. However, another type of target, better suited to
the management issue, can easily be fixed, e.g. the average concentration in several
wells, or its maximal value. In the same line of thought, the time when the target
should be reached could also be an adjusted variable, although the hydro-geological
condition will not make it possible to reach all the objectives at all times. To return
to models, it is supposed that both AROPAj-STICS and MODCOU perform well
enough for us to have confidence in their simulation. As stated before, these models
were assessed in several contexts and, although they are not perfect, they were
found suitable for such a theoretical study. Other important assumptions are the
stability of the climatic and economic conditions. It is quite probable that economic
conditions will change according to the outcome of agricultural policy, changes in
world trade and climatic conditions. Such changes will be taken into account in a
following study
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Figure 1: The Seine basin (shape) and the three main overlaid aquifer layers, from top to bottom:
the Oligocene (dark gray), the Eocene (gray) and the Chalk (light gray).
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of the coupling methodology: 1st, comparison of the AROPAj
STICS and STICS MODCOU annual root zone nitrogen fluxes (red and green boxes) for the
reference year 2002 shows a good match 2nd, the tax scenario and associated annual root zone
nitrogen flux (orange to purple boxes) simulated by AROPAj were then disaggregated on time
according to the 2002 STICS daily evolution, and the daily fluxes transmitted to MODCOU the
temporal evolution of the aquifer concentration analyzed on a annual basis (blue circles).
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Figure 3: Monetary marginal damage as a function of targeted NO3 concentration level (in bold:
a and beta following uniform distributions; in gray: a and β following lognormal distributions).
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Figure 5: Profit plus tax receipt over time related to the 50 mgNO3/l (left) and the 38 mgNO3/l
(right) target, when the tax path is optimal (solid black), constant (solid grey), reaches 90% of
the steady state tax exponentially in 20 years (dashed) and in 10 years (dotted), and when the
amplitude of livestock adjustment changes from 0 (down) to 45% (top) of initial livestock by
increment of 15%.)
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Figure 6: Nitrate concentration path related to scenarios differing in tax path and livestock
adjustement, regarding the two targets (long-term value of 50 and 38 mgNO3/l in the aquifer),
when the tax path is optimal (solid black), constant (solid gray), reaches 90% of the steady state tax
exponentially in 20 years (dashed) and in 10 years (dotted), and when the amplitude of livestock
adjustment changes from 0 (bottom) to 45% (top) of initial livestock by increments of 15%.
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Figure 7: Welfare in the case of 50 mgNO3 /l nitrate concentration target,when the tax path is
optimal (solid black), constant (solid gray), reaches 90% of the steady state tax exponentially in 20
years (dashed) and in 10 years (dotted), and when the amplitude of livestock adjustment changes
from 0 (bottom) to 45% (top) of initial livestock by increments of 15%.
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Figure 8: Welfare in the case of 38 mgNO3 /l nitrate concentration target,when the tax path is
optimal (solid black), constant (solid gray), reaches 90% of the steady state tax exponentially in 20
years (dashed) and in 10 years (dotted), and when the amplitude of livestock adjustment changes
from 0 (bottom) to 45% (top) of initial livestock by increments of 15 %.
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Table 1: Distributions of physical parameter values (aquifer thickness 1/a and time
lag, β).
Parameter Distribution Min 1st Quartile. Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max
1/a ln(ā/a) 7→ N (0, 0.18) 6.6 12.0 13.6 13.8 15.4 25.8
1/a 1/a 7→ U [5, 22.2] 5.0 9.3 13.6 13.6 17.9 22.2
β ln(β/β̄) 7→ N (0, 0.25) 8.2 16.9 20.0 20.6 23.6 64.3
β β 7→ U [10, 30] 10.0 15.0 20.0 20.0 24.9 30.0
τ constant 0.02
δ constant 0.04
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Table 2: Variation and decomposition of discounted welfare in scenarios differing by
livestock adjustment (α, amplitude in % of the initial value) compared to the opti-
mal tax scenario without livestock adjustment, for two NO3 concentration targets
(mg/l).
Target(mg/l) 50 38
alpha /scenario BAU optimal constant 10 years 20 years BAU optimal constant 10 years 20 years
0%
Welfare 25906 25910 25911 25910 25910 11834 12958 12892 12775 12661
Variation -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -8.72 0.00 -0.51 -1.41 -2.29
Net Gross Margin 27150 27141 27142 27144 27146 27154 26212 26489 26613 26717
Tax 0 602 571 506 447 0 2870 2684 2470 2252
Damage 1244 1230 1231 1234 1235 15331 13254 13596 13837 14506
15%
Welfare 26223 26233 26221 26219 13300 13327 13105 12990
Variation 3.83 3.82 3.82 3.81 2.64 2.08 1.14 0.24
Net Gross Margin 27452 27452 27453 27454 26515 26791 26916 27020
Tax 404 383 338 298 2823 2644 2435 2222
Damage 1228 1229 1232 1234 13214 13564 13810 14030
30%
Welfare 26446 26446 26444 26442 13551 13477 13355 13233
Variation 4.71 4.71 4.70 4.69 4.57 4.00 3.06 2.12
Net Gross Margin 27674 27674 27675 27675 26727 27007 27133 27238
Tax 402 381 336 296 2783 2613 2409 2199
Damage 1227 1228 1231 1233 13175 13529 13778 14005
45%
Welfare 26667 26661 26663 26660 13797 13720 13594 13471
Variation 7.92 7.91 7.91 7.91 6.47 5.88 4.90 3.95
Net Gross Margin 27892 27892 27892 27890 26933 27215 27343 27449
Tax 202 191 168 148 2754 2591 2390 2183
Damage 1225 1231 1230 1232 13136 13495 13748 13978
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Table 3: Sensitivity of long-term marginal damage to discount rate, for two NO3
concentration targets (mg/l).
β /Discount rate 3 % 4% 5%
Target 50 (mg/l)
30% 1.47 2.19 3.15
0% 0.78 0.94 1.09
Target 38 (mg/l)
30% 14.68 21.5 31.80
0% 7.80 9.36 10.92
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Table 4: Sensitivity of cumulated discounted welfare and its decomposition to dis-
count rate for two NO3 concentration targets (mg/l).
Target(mg/l) 50 38
alpha /scenario BAU optimal constant 10 years 20 years BAU optimal constant 10 years 20 years
Discount rate 3%
Welfare 33954 33955 33954 33954 33954 21398 22482 22445 22349 22249
Net Gross Margin 35017 35000 35001 35004 35005 35017 33839 34158 34288 34406
Tax 0 775 734 669 604 0 3680 3462 3241 3003
Damage 1061 1045 1047 1049 1051 13618 11358 11713 11939 12157
Discount rate 4%
Welfare 25906 25910 25911 25910 25910 11834 12958 12892 12775 12661
Net Gross Margin 27150 27141 27142 27144 27146 27154 26212 26489 26613 26717
Tax 0 602 571 506 447 0 2870 2684 2470 2252
Damage 1244 1230 1231 1234 1235 15331 13254 13596 13837 14506
Discount rate 5%
Welfare 20620 20622 20622 20622 20622 4384 5545 5545 5317 5190
Net Gross Margin 21989 21978 21979 21981 21989 21982 21206 21450 21569 21663
Tax 0 490 463 400 347 0 2336 2174 1967 1766
Damage 1369 1356 1357 1359 1361 17605 15661 15995 16252 16472
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